PROJECT MUSE®

What Participatory Research and Methods Bring To Ethics:
Insights From Pragmatism, Social Science, and Psychology

Eric Racine

Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Volume 34, Number 1, March 2024, pp. 99-134 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: *https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2024.a943431*

For additional information about this article
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/943431

[132.204.9.239] Project MUSE (2024-12-03 13:43 GMT) University of Montreal

Eric Racine[*1-5]

What Participatory Research and Methods Bring To Ethics: Insights From Pragmatism, Social Science, and Psychology

ABSTRACT. Ethics can be envisioned as a process where human beings move from a more passive stance in their moral lives to a more active one, in which the moral aspects of their lives become the basis of a project to best live one's life. Participatory research and methods would appear essential to ethics in this light, yet they remain rather marginally used in bioethics. In this article, I argue that participatory research methods are particularly compelling means of ethical enactments because of their ability—when carried out properly—to help promote

Affiliations:
[1]Pragmatic Health Ethics Research Unit, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
[2]Faculté de médecine, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada
[3]Division of Experimental Medicine, McGill University, Montréal, QC, Canada
[4]Department of Neurology and Neurosurgery, McGill University, Montréal, QC, Canada
[5]Department of Medicine and Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada

* Address for correspondence:
Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal (IRCM)
110 avenue des Pins Ouest
Montréal, QC H2W 1R7
Tel: (514) 987-5723
Fax: (514) 987-5763
Email: eric.racine@ircm.qc.ca

Funding statement: This work was supported by a career award of the Fonds de recherche du Québec - Santé [271913] to ER.

Acknowledgments: I wish to thank members of the Pragmatic Health Ethics Research Unit for constructive feedback on a previous version of this manuscript. Special thanks to Pauline Lenfant-Koenig, Nicole Padley, and Juliette Durocher for editorial assistance and Caroline Favron-Godbout for feedback on a previous version of this manuscript.

Conflict of interest declaration: The author declares no conflict of interests.

[132.204.9.239] Project MUSE (2024-12-03 13:43 GMT) University of Montreal

self-actualization. Although I cannot review in detail the vast array of participatory research undertaken in management, education, communication, and so on, I pinpoint the advantages of this orientation to research, especially in light of a pragmatist and deliberative form of ethics that aims to help understand and enact human flourishing. These advantages include: (1) the co-understanding and co-reconstruction of problem situations and responses; (2) the importance attributed to meaning and intersubjectivity; (3) mutual learning (moral co-learning); (4) empowerment for effective eudemonistic change; and (5) opening the evaluation of outcomes to human flourishing. I also explain that these attributes of participatory research and methods do not preclude the use of non-participatory methods and approaches in ethics.

1. INTRODUCTION

Ethics is a science and practice of human action insofar as ethics attempts to contribute to enlightening difficult choices and situations. However, ethics has often remained confined to being a science and practice of human moral reasoning and judgment. There is indeed a powerful trend that has brought ethics to focus on ethical judgments and moral reasoning, to the point of almost forgetting to return to human actions and practices. Fesmire writes that: "there is a central dogma of ethical theory, namely that it rests on revealing or constructing a moral bedrock that tells us the right way to think about moral problems" (2003, 55). For several decades now, bioethics as we know it has made great strides in bringing ethics closer to life. In a classic paper, Toulmin (1982) noted how medicine literally saved ethics insofar as biomedical and health sciences contributed to bringing ethics to bear to real-world problems. Some, like Susan Wolf and Jonathan Moreno, have also noted how bioethics has implicitly espoused ideas close to pragmatism, a school of thinking reputed for attributing importance to human experience and to the crucial role of action in human experience (Moreno 1999; Wolf 1994). The strong uptake of empirical research (the empirical turn) in bioethics is another sign that bioethics remains an experience-oriented force within broader ethics scholarship and practice (Borry, Schotsmans, and Dierickx 2005; Wangmo et al. 2018).

There are likely several reasons why bioethics and so many of its scholars and practitioners are strongly attracted to experience-oriented philosophies and forms of ethics such as empirical ethics. The requirements of the work of bioethics itself, to accompany various stakeholders (e.g., clinicians,

patients, relatives) in understanding and overcoming difficult situations, is certainly one (Andre 2004). Another is the early realization that some more traditional forms of top-down ethics could not offer the help needed to undertake such tasks (for a classic analysis, see Callahan 1973). Some reasons could also be more controversial, such as bioethics seeking to mimic the epistemology and standards of scientifically informed fields like medicine and biomedical science. Indeed, there is a risk that the desire for respect and credibility may sometimes propel bioethics into narrower forms of empiricism and positivism (Draper and Ives 2007). At the same time, the common use of qualitative research in bioethics in comparison to, for example, business ethics, where behavioral economics tends to sway empirical research toward social psychology (for a critical analysis on this trend in business ethics, see Bell, Winchester, and Wray-Bliss 2021), reassures that empirical research is often a driving force toward holistic understandings of difficult human experiences. Humanization is indeed a definite contribution of qualitative research in ethics and beyond (Murray 2003). Yet, despite the strong attraction to empirical and, specifically, qualitative research in bioethics, participatory research remains marginal, especially for empirical research, which is the main focus of this article. More conceptual research can also be undertaken using participatory and co-creative approaches, as shown by the example of Cascio's work cited below and the growing practice of engaging patients and other stakeholders in more conceptual ethics work (Sample et al. 2019; Racine et al. 2024).

In this article, I first review the state of participatory research in bioethics, especially empirical research, and then offer an argument from a pragmatist perspective on its importance, even though this is likely an argument shared by non-pragmatists. Pragmatism helps make the case for the more proper ethical value of participatory research. Then, I review five specific reasons why participatory research is of great importance in ethics. These reasons are gleaned from the literature as well as my own experiences as an ethics scholar who has been involved in numerous participatory projects. These reasons are also grounded in insights from pragmatist theory, which provides a particularly compelling explanatory foundation for participatory approaches in ethics research and practice. However, these reasons could hold true above and beyond the commitment to certain assumptions of pragmatist theory. Third, to avoid inducing any needless dualisms and dichotomies between participatory and non-participatory research, I briefly discuss the limitations of participatory research and the usefulness of non-participatory approaches. Notwithstanding some of

the challenges posed by participatory research in bioethics and potential barriers to its development, and with the hope of sharing interest for this orientation, I wish to bring forth some of its contributions. In doing so, I leave aside the proper and extensive consideration of ethical issues raised by participatory research itself (e.g., Guillemin and Gillam 2004; Buchanan, Miller, and Wallerstein 2007; Kwan and Walsh 2018), which merits due and dedicated treatment. Also, although the argument presented is made with reference to health and the field of bioethics, there is also a larger argument to make for participatory research in ethics more generally, beyond the domain of health and of bioethics.

2. PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH IN BIOETHICS

Qualitative research is now common in bioethics and supports the entire spirit of the general experiential orientation of bioethics, but participatory research remains more marginal despite some significant contributions. Whereas qualitative research typically tries to understand lived experience using methods that allow us to grasp meaning and narratives, participatory research engages subjects as participants. Following Montreuil et al. (2021), I distinguish between participatory research and participatory methods. Participatory methods rely on data-gathering strategies involving direct engagement with participants to collect the research data. Participatory research implies the direct involvement of participants in making key decisions about the research process itself (e.g., research questions, data analysis, research result communication strategies). In other words, participatory research implies that research is not done *on* but *with* participants. For example, Bergold and Thomas write that:

> Participatory research methods are geared towards planning and conducting the research process with those people whose life-world and meaningful actions are under study. Consequently, this means that the aim of the inquiry and the research questions develop out of the convergence of two perspectives—that of science and of practice. In the best case, both sides benefit from the research process. Everyday practices, which have long since established themselves as a subject of inquiry, introduce their own perspective, namely, the way people deal with the existential challenges of everyday life. The participatory research process enables co-researchers to step back cognitively from familiar routines, forms of interaction, and power relationships in order to fundamentally question and rethink established interpretations of situations and strategies. However, the convergence of the perspectives of science and practice does not come about simply by deciding

> to conduct participatory research. Rather, it is a very demanding process that evolves when two spheres of action—science and practice—meet, interact, and develop an understanding for each other. (2012, 2)

The pioneering participatory bioethics work of Abma, Voskes, and Widdershoven (2017) illustrates how this approach can lead to social impact and foster collaborative moral learning. For example, their study on coercion reduction in Dutch psychiatry led to the reduction of the use of coercive measures and greater awareness of the harms created by this measure. Likewise, Montreuil et al. (2020) developed participatory bioethics with children in mental health. This work shows how children can be engaged in sharing their healthcare experiences. It also showcases how involving them in a participatory study is not only beneficial to them but to an entire clinical unit. The latter can learn from these findings and enact relevant changes to humanize the clinical experience, notably with respect to the regular use of restraints and seclusion in the context of the management of crises (Montreuil et al. 2020). This work demonstrates that a punitive and controlling approach runs counter to the enactment of more humane and collaborative approaches. Another example is Cascio and colleagues' work to develop person-oriented research ethics in the context of autism. Person-oriented research ethics is a framework supplementing (not replacing) existing regulatory and procedural approaches in research ethics; it aims to strengthen the relational and humanistic dimensions of research ethics, which are often neglected by more regulatory approaches (Cascio and Racine 2018). With her collaborators, including several autistics, their parents, and their clinicians, Cascio et al. (2020) developed a set of best practices based on the person-oriented research ethics framework using a participatory research and writing process. This framework is now being prospectively tested and enriched in a study of person-oriented research ethics for a community-oriented autism study in Ottawa, Canada.[1] Finally, there is Quintal's more recent work on rare diseases. Using a participatory action research design reminiscent of Abma's work, she and her colleagues (patient partners,[2] ethicists, clinicians) engaged the rare disease community in Quebec, Canada, in a participatory research process based on surveys, semi-structured interviews, and working group meetings to produce an ethics action plan[3] (Quintal et al. 2023). This work has called attention to very difficult and morally problematic situations faced by a highly stigmatized group of patients whose symptoms are often dismissed. It also set the stage to identify concrete actions—consistent with action research design—to be taken in response to these situations. This plan includes

knowledge mobilization initiatives to sensitize healthcare professionals to the difficult and challenging realities of people with rare diseases.

These illustrative examples of participatory research and participatory action research showcase some of their common benefits in bioethics (and beyond). Participatory research, like qualitative research, provides a process where people who are marginalized or silenced (e.g., people with rare diseases, children with mental health problems, adult psychiatric patients, autistics) can be heard. In addition, it engages them in actions to change their situation. It is therefore a step forward in promoting and supporting people as ethical *agents* rather than moral *patients*.[4] In addition, because the projects are typically constructed based on the engagement of stakeholders from the outset, they enable participants to contribute to the formulation of the research questions, the study design, the study tools, and a whole range of other steps, such as data analysis, manuscript writing, and knowledge mobilization. Participatory action research furthers the idea of "learning by doing" as participants try to understand and act on their situation (Jacobs 2018). Yet, although there are convincing benefits to such methods, they remain rather seldom used in ethics.

One might wonder at the infrequent use of participatory research and participatory methods in bioethics—especially in an age where co-design and co-creation are sweeping forces in healthcare and beyond (Langley, Wolstenholme, and Cooke 2018). One reason could be that such methods are often not very well known, since they are part of a much broader pool of research methods deployed in empirical bioethics research (Sugarman, Faden, and Weinstein 2001). In fact, a follow-up review of the empirical turn in bioethics identified overwhelming trends for the simple use of semi-structured interviews and surveys (Wangmo et al. 2018), with very few studies combining several research methods, despite the value of triangulation and more contextual, ethnographic-like research approaches. Although participatory research can sometimes rely on semi-structured interviews alone, this is less clearly the case for surveys, which typically do not engage participants in formulating questions and share extensive experiential perspectives. The evidence about the homogeneous methods in bioethics research is indirect and suggestive of the rare adoption of participatory research, which tends to imply multiple methods of engagement at once (e.g., focus groups, participant observation).

Participatory research is also potentially less well known by reviewers and funders of research, thus making obtaining support for such research designs more difficult and daunting. Moreover, participatory projects

tend to be complex, requiring tight management of research processes to create the conditions for participants to meaningfully contribute to research steps. This puts an additional pressure on researchers to ensure an ergonomic research experience for participants (notably, given that they may have disabilities, experience estrangement from mainstream research and healthcare, or be neurodiverse, as seen in participatory research undertaken to date). For example, Quintal and Cascio's work involved extensive workshopping and team meetings much beyond conventional empirical or qualitative research (Cascio et al. 2020; Quintal et al. 2023). They also made many adjustments to their research protocols to account for individual and group specificities of autistics (e.g., accommodation during group work for sensory sensibilities) and people with rare diseases (e.g., frequency and timing of meetings).

Yet another obstacle can be the need to obtain some flexibility from research ethics committees to provide room for the evolving nature of participatory research. When research ethics committees and guidelines require overly stringent protocols, it can be very difficult to carry out participatory research. Participatory research requires multiple amendments to study protocols to adapt the unfolding study to its context (Khanlou and Peter 2005). Despite these challenges and the infrequent use of participatory research and methods in bioethics, participatory research is intrinsically tied to pragmatism. However, this is often overlooked in common accounts of pragmatist ethics in bioethics.

3. PRAGMATISM AND PARTICIPATORY ETHICS RESEARCH

Pragmatism has been presented both as a distinctive tradition of bioethics (Fins, Bacchetta, and Miller 1998; McGee 2003; Miller, Fins, and Bacchetta 1996) and as a potentially looming epistemological orientation that colors much of bioethics itself (Moreno 1999; Racine 2008b; Wolf 1994), such that there are different strands of pragmatist bioethics. Pragmatism is a multifaceted and interdisciplinary intellectual and social movement that first took shape in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mostly in the United States (Menand 2001; Misak 2013). One of the core tenets of pragmatism, despite its various formulations by William James, Jane Addams, John Dewey, and neo-pragmatists like Rorty, Habermas, and Putnam, is an epistemological axiom first formulated in 1868 by Charles Sanders Peirce. This maxim, often dubbed the pragmatic maxim, states that the meaning of our ideas is best expounded when we can spell out the implications or the effects of these ideas in real-world experience and

[132.204.9.239] Project MUSE (2024-12-03 13:43 GMT) University of Montreal

practice (Peirce 1878).[5] This is an idea that William James also expressed using the metaphor of the "cash value of our ideas" (Cotkin 1985). When this insight is applied to ideas and concepts that concern the person, it leads to thinking of people as agents, as experimenters who test their ideas and learn about morality from experience. As Legg and Cookway (2021) put it, "pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that— very broadly— understands knowing as inseparable from agency within it." This explains why Dewey, for example, developed experiential learning, which was later further theorized by Kolb (1984). It also explains why pragmatist thinking leads to thinking of democracy as not only a mode of governance, but as a mode of learning and experiencing the world while involving citizen co-learners (Pappas 2008).

When this line of thinking is explored in the context of ethics, it leads to thinking about ethics as a form of learning about human morality, and especially as engaged and active learning associated with action and experimentation (Aiguier and Loute 2016). Accordingly, participation is an essential part of the ethical life insofar as an agent is someone who learns about human morality and uses experiential and more scientific[6] knowledge to guide their moral life and seek human flourishing or human development (Pekarsky 1990; Racine et al. 2019; Racine [2025]). Growth, empowerment, and flourishing are ways of describing human well-being that move beyond quality of life (Baumeister et al. 2013). These cardinal life orientations have garnered renewed interest in humanistic psychology in recent decades (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000), but they are also at the basis of ancient ethics, where there was a real engagement with the life worth living—the eudemonistic life (Parry and Thorsrud 2021). Pragmatism is also engaged with this idea in ways that call for a vision of the knowledge about the flourishing life, which can be called wisdom, phronesis, or deliberative wisdom as advanced in deliberative wisdom theory (Racine, 2025). This open orientation implies that human flourishing, as deployed in this theoretical context, is a process of growth and an ability to experience and reflect on deeper aspects of human welfare. As I argue in this article, this view is aligned with much—although not necessarily all—of participatory research, which also emphasizes how people can become agents and gain awareness of their situation, project goals, and valuations to then act accordingly (Wallengren Lynch 2016). However, it is possible for participatory research to be explanted out of its deeper epistemological orientations, such that it becomes another research

method or another strategy that simply retransforms people as passive recipients of knowledge, change, and so forth.

Participatory research and methods are no strangers to pragmatism (and vice versa), since there are close relationships between pragmatism and participatory research (Biesta 2015; Frega and Carreira da Silva 2011) and, even more specifically, between participatory approaches, pragmatism, and ethics (Inguaggiato, Metselaar, Porz ; Inguaggiato, Metselaar, Widdershoven et al. 2019; Metselaar et al. 2017). The classic pragmatist thinkers were heavily involved in social causes and social change (Fischer 2023; New York Times 1952; Pappas 2008).[7] Figures of pragmatism—often women who were excluded from academic settings and pushed back into practical settings, such as schools (Whipps and Lake 2020), undertook concrete actions to promote the flourishing and development of immigrants, women, racialized persons, and others who were marginalized from mainstream American society.[8] Their participatory and engaged methods inspired the more theoretical pragmatist work of Dewey and Mead, for example, and served as demonstrations of the power of pragmatist philosophy to foster flourishing, justice, and development though engaged and participatory approaches (Fischer 2023). Allusions to this rich history of participation in pragmatism and its indefectible commitment to social change and social justice are rare in ethics scholarship.

Contemporary participatory research recognizes and builds on the idea that individuals are agents and gain something valuable from being agents. Paul Freire (2000) elaborates on the emancipatory process of conscientization by which stakeholders gain a critical understanding of their own situation through reflection and action. This connection between agency and knowledge is especially aligned with classic and contemporary pragmatism. However, the interest in participatory research stands independently of commitments to pragmatism as a specific theoretical background that justifies its values from a philosophical and ethical standpoint. As a methodological orientation,[9] participatory research promotes the use of methods that (1) grant great importance to the meaning and experiential aspects of lived situations, and (2) recognize the profound value of agency, as well as the ability to act on one's situation based one's interests, values, human development, and flourishing (Chevalier and Buckles 2013; Reason and Bradbury 2008). They embody a demanding perspective on research and knowledge that envisions knowledge as empowering, useful to, and connected to everyday life.

As a type of research and a methodological orientation, participatory research takes many contemporary forms, such as participatory action research (Chevalier and Buckles 2013; Whyte 1991), Photovoice (Budig et al. 2018), and living labs (Hossain, Leminen, and Westerlund 2019), often with the goal of empowering those concerned with lived and situated problems (Cascio and Racine 2019). But participatory methods can be used beyond the setting of research, namely as an approach to action. Participatory approaches have been employed to lead organizations in the form of participatory governance and leadership (Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research 2016; Fischer 2012), to promote public dialogue on science and technology assessment (Hennen 2012; Racine 2002), to develop the economy and banking system (for example, in the form of cooperatives [Bélanger 2012; Sen 1999]), to foster participatory approaches in education (Whitehead and McNiff 2006), and so on. However, even if participatory approaches are not used as part of research—in a narrower sense—they will remain forms of action involving some amount of learning about oneself, others, and the world. Think here, for instance, of participatory management practices; work environments where action is based on consultation processes where people's experiences and deliberative abilities are mobilized; and participation fostered in some non-profit organizations, among others. These are all examples of methods that allow us to bridge experiential and theoretical knowledge to practices. They also promote the sharing of this knowledge and the development of human capabilities, even though they may not always be used as part of research itself (Clark et al. 2019). Importantly, non-participatory methods can also be used in ways that foster growth and flourishing, especially if they (and their results) are utilized in ways that cohere with a participatory (educational, institutional, societal) orientation. In the following pages, I build from the connection between a pragmatist account of ethics oriented toward flourishing (Racine, 2025) and participatory research to describe the latter's valuable attributes. That said, I recognize that the value of participatory research methods could be articulated from different standpoints.

4. CO-UNDERSTANDING AND CO-RECONSTRUCTION OF PROBLEM SITUATIONS AND RESPONSES

Participatory approaches concur on the importance of context much like other (e.g., qualitative) research approaches that emphasize the importance of understanding a moral problem from the point of view of those who are concerned (Inguaggiato, Metselaar, Porz et al. 2019; Inguaggiato,

Metselaar, Widdershoven et al., 2019). However, participatory research and methods engage participants more directly as agents in processes to co-understand problem situations, and as co-imaginators in those situations' development and the enactment of responses (Lehoux, Miller, and Williams-Jones 2020; Racine, 2025). Such an experiential and engaged understanding of problems and responses is beneficial to truly grasp the meaning of a problem situation and of the related situated experiences of those concerned. As a result, participatory research and methods are advantageous in their ability to promote awareness about issues and challenges as lived situations from the perspective of moral agents who are active first-persons within situations (and not moral patients to whom events happen; Pluhar 1988). Because of their engagement with testing ideas in interaction and in action, participatory research and methods invite self-reflection about the limitations of one's conceptual framework to grasp a problem situation.

Furthermore, participatory approaches convey not only the idea that moral problems are contextualized, but also that the ability to think about and act on problems is also shaped by context. Pragmatism explains that moral problems are lived, situated experiences. Further, lived situations are transactional episodes constituted of agents and context(s), such that it is crucial to understand these dimensions of the situations (Brinkmann 2011; Foucart 2013). This is best done when adopting processes that promote a (1) contextualized understanding of agential perspectives on the situation, and (2) the agent-dependent aspects of the context, such that the two are in some ways inseparable as a holistic unit. Given that they are initiated—when properly wielded—in specific contexts and with specific agents, participatory approaches are well positioned to support the initial steps of ethical reflection and ethical deliberation through an iterative process of deliberation (Brown, Kitson, and McKnight 1992; Racine, 2025) in ways that take into account this reciprocal constitution of agents and contexts. From a research standpoint, even though this is true of participatory research as a whole, there are certain methods (e.g., participatory ethnography) that may be particularly well suited to capture the contextual aspects of human agency and the human-dependent aspects of contexts (Montreuil and Carnevale 2018). Although ethnography may appear to be a participatory method (e.g., researchers interact with participants through participant observation), participatory or collaborative ethnography further involves participants in co-creating understandings and narratives (Lassiter 2005; Ntelioglou 2015). Other

methods, like Photovoice, may be particularly well placed to position the understanding of the situation and a response to it in the hands of those concerned (Budig et al. 2018).

5. CENTRALITY OF MEANING AND THE ROLE OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Values are a fundamental way of attributing meaning and significance to life experiences, and participatory approaches support the acquisition of meaning and the process of meaning-making as part of an active moral life. Values are a key component of personal identity because they constitute who we are and how we see ourselves. They are integral to well-being from a psychological standpoint because a person can only be judged to thrive and flourish when they actualize who they are and project themselves to be that way (Hitlin 2003). These connections between ethics, moral meaning-making based on values, and personal identity are recognized and thematized by theories like pragmatism (Gross 2009), as well as by theories that explain the narrative structure of the self and identity (Ricoeur 1990).[11] Qualitative research has made an incredible contribution to showing the importance of value to meaning-making, but participatory research helps further instill the idea that meaning-making is partly a collective and, thus, intersubjective process that can be supported by the active engagement of participants.

While recognizing the centrality of meaning and the subjective point of view, participatory approaches help overcome solipsism, from which the meanings of individual or collective action hardly make any sense. Intersubjectivity and intersubjective processes offer an alternative to crude objectivism and realist philosophy, which tend to expel realities that are not testable by the conventional scientific method, or in a narrow positivistic or objectivist sense (Dewey 1941).[12] They also offer an alternative to subjectivism and the relativism engendered by bringing, to paraphrase Protagoras, the measure of all things to one's isolated subjective experience. One way to explain the role of intersubjectivity in participatory approaches is to appeal to pragmatism's concept of inquiry as a social process (Jacobs 2018). For pragmatist theories and ethical approaches, truths need to be tested as "hypotheses" within inquiries, but this "testing" is much more broadly minded than the idea of traditional laboratory experimentation (see a pragmatist account linking experimentation to participatory research in Racine et al. 2019). Also, such testing and experimenting do not imply a subject–object dualism, despite the dominant positivist connotations of words like "hypotheses" and "testing," because they are embedded

in the understanding that knowledge is part of organism–environment transactions (Brinkmann 2011; Foucart 2013). Rather, from a pragmatist standpoint, testing and experimenting efforts reflect that subjectivity and first-person experience are part of the world and are inherent to meaning-making, agency, growth, and flourishing. Accordingly, participatory research also sets up ethics as a form of collaborative inquiry where what we value—and the standards we use to assess what we value—can be elaborated and enriched based on exchanges with others, experiences, and ideations for future-oriented scenarios (Ralston 2010).[13] Participatory research thus brings the centrality of meaning-making as an active and intersubjective process to the forefront of human moral experience.

6. MUTUAL LEARNING (MORAL CO-LEARNING)

Another valuable characteristic of participatory research—especially worthy in the eyes of pragmatist ethics—is that, via its emphasis on the understanding of the meaning of events and situations for stakeholders, and on the connection between thinking and action, it promotes mutual learning (co-learning). For example, participatory action research and community-based participatory research foster mutual learning between people. They also encourage cooperation and getting to know each other as part of a project, vision, or agenda for change, all processes that support co-learning (Chevalier and Buckles 2013; Reason and Bradbury 2008; Whitehead and McNiff 2006; Whyte 1991). Moreover, the development of shared visions for action is also a moment of mutual learning because of the processes implied in trying to agree on different action scenarios and trying to identify the best action scenarios and the underlying reasons why they represent a better option in the given context. When an action resulting from participatory research is evaluated, there is also the possibility of learning about other people's values and experiences because of the outcome measurement methods favored. In other words, participatory approaches are an invitation to dialogue and exchange because participation increases motivation. They foster mutual understanding and learning between people and traditions because of the commitment to reconstructing the problem situation in ways that involve stakeholders and of also considering shared goals and scenarios (Racine et al. 2019). This contribution is valuable for pragmatist ethics (and the like), which value moral learning, and for which dialogue on experiences and valuations is an enriching and learning process (Abma et al. 2017; Aiguier and Loute 2016; Senghor and Racine 2022).

[132.204.9.239] Project MUSE (2024-12-03 13:43 GMT) University of Montreal

7. EMPOWERING EFFECTIVE EUDEMONISTIC CHANGE

The epistemology promulgated by pragmatism underscores how means are interwoven to ends, leading Dewey, for example, to state that people show their commitment to ends based on the energy they dedicate to the means to pursue these ends (Bidet 2011). However, contrary to what some—including some self-identified pragmatists—believe, effectiveness of action, in the narrow sense, is not the goal of pragmatism. Achieving outcomes that make people grow and flourish is what is really sought by pragmatist ethics, because this goal expresses a progressive and constructive orientation to human life (Pekarsky 1990; Serra 2010). Now, assessments of effectiveness still apply to the pursuit of such eudemonistic goals (e.g., growth, human development), but in more thoughtful or open-ended ways than what is sometimes assumed when monolithic accounts of human flourishing are assumed (for a discussion on this topic, see Lanteigne, Genest, and Racine [2021], who discuss how accounts of human flourishing are reduced to autonomy in transition care). Assessing the realization of eudemonistic goals and outcomes requires self-reflection, which involves a critical analysis of why something is valued (e.g., autonomy), including a situational analysis of why a given context occurs (e.g., why young adults with chronic illnesses are projected as independent and autonomous persons) and why an agent believes what they believe in such a context (e.g., adhering or not to paradigmatic autonomy in transition care or siding for more relational values; see Racine et al. [2012]). Indeed, some goals that are valuable in principle (e.g., emphasizing autonomy) can become problematic in some contexts (e.g., when agents are unprepared to make decisions), such that their critical analysis may reveal to the agent entertaining or involving them that they are problematic because they induce languishing and run counter to a person's flourishing.

Keeping these caveats in mind, there is nevertheless a very real ability of participatory research and methods to successfully support the development and flourishing of agents. This is evidenced in the empowerment literature (Budig et al. 2018; Clark et al. 2019; Perkins 1995). Participatory research supports such human development because participation is inherently about the relationship between agents and their contexts, and it mobilizes knowledge (of agents, contexts, and the transactions of agents in contexts) to help agents realize what they value. Such control of circumstances and ability to effectively actualize oneself is key to many diverse accounts of human flourishing (Ryff and Singer 2008; Sioui and Gros-Louis McHugh 2021). Of interest, here, is that participatory research and participatory

enactment of changes actually represent effective ways of bringing about change because change is most effective when agents or participants identify authentically with that change, such as when they see change as being connected to their intrinsic motivations (Chirkove et al. 2003; Deci and Ryan 2000). In the case of participatory research, this identification and internalization of goals is explicitly co-constructed and tapped into.

Participatory research's effects can be realized even in cases where its outcomes are not fully met. For example, participatory approaches consider that agents can exercise their ability to change their environments, themselves, their attitudes and behaviors, their life philosophies (i.e., valuations of different interests and goals throughout the research process). They are, therefore, eudemonistically effective, in the sense that not only the outcomes matter, the agencies are mobilized, and engagement is fostered in ways that constitute the person. These kinds of eudemonistic benefits help explain the motivational strength of these approaches and their liberating effects (Racine 2022). Also, participants are often motivated by methods that include them as agents in the actual understanding of a given problem, and they are motivated by the possibility of being part of the solution (Jagosh et al. 2012). Now, obviously, participatory approaches are not a panacea. Motivation can be affected by other things, including one's self-understanding as an agent (or a non-agent), one's understanding of their self-interest, and so on. Change and participation in change are also not equivalent to self-actualization.

From a transactional stance,[14] change is viewed as at least a minimal participation in one's environment and self-actualization. This "participation" can be passive when the agent simply lets the environment structure the course of their existence—and the term participation may be misleading here—but it becomes active participation when the agent acts. This being said, the most wanted and esteemed change is one that occurs as the result of thoughtful deliberation and choice, such that it reflects the profound aspirations of participants. Therefore, achieving that change cannot be dismissed as irrelevant for ethics, but is actually fundamental to the very nature of ethical concepts as instruments of flourishing and self-actualization (Racine et al. 2019). In this light, participatory research is highly valuable because it is motivated by the desire to transform practices and situations in response to how participants understand a situation and the solutions they imagine in response to it. It remains, however, that participation and change need to be evaluated for their actual and concrete ability to contribute to flourishing. Not all participation leads to human

flourishing, but human flourishing most often implies the ability to not only bring about change, but to do so in a way that reflects one's truly and deeply held values. Indeed, participation, in the stronger sense, reflects such a kind of transaction between the organism and the environment; participation is a transaction of self-actualization.

8. OPENING THE EVALUATION OF OUTCOMES TO HUMAN FLOURISHING

If the idea that ethics embodies the pursuit of a life of open-ended flourishing and moral learning is welcomed, then there must be ways by which ethical ideas are assessed for their outcomes even if that entails moving beyond the typical schemes of what and how things can be assessed. As argued by Peirce (1877; 1878), notably, the highest (or at least a high) level of knowledge and insight is achieved when we understand the implications of our beliefs while not precluding that many forms of knowledge exist (e.g., experiential, scientific) and that current knowledge is often limited. And to really know these implications of our beliefs and ideas, the assessment of the outcomes (or implications) of acting on these beliefs or ideas is required. This insight is key to a pragmatist epistemology and does not completely correspond with "pragmatic methods of outcome evaluation," which sometimes simply stress the connection of evaluation procedures to real-world outcomes (Crane et al. 2019; Glasgow 2013). These latter pragmatic methods are not necessarily pragmatist in the sense that they adopt a pragmatist or instrumentalist stance on the truth conditions of ideas (Racine et al. 2019). They are also not always envisioned as participatory in nature. From a pragmatist standpoint, ethical knowledge has to be meaningful insofar as it connects to the outcomes sought by stakeholders and that, to do so, a connection with the experience of stakeholders and the language they use to make sense of their situation is required, including the outcomes they seek and value (Callahan 1973; Fiester 2015).

Participatory approaches bring a useful set of strategies to assess outcomes in ways that matter to those concerned and connect to their development and flourishing. Because of the continuous engagement of stakeholders in different stages of research, participatory research helps keep a focus on eudemonistic outcomes (i.e., outcomes that have meaning to participants as ethical agents). This helps participatory research avoid the trap of reducing outcomes to narrow, pre-defined, and poorly communicated epistemological criteria that only partially capture the sought-after outcome or, worse, profoundly distort the sought outcome

because of the measurement tool used and the way a given outcome is operationalized. Participatory research can also avoid measuring outcomes that are poorly connected with what was actually sought in the first place (i.e., real-world outcomes), especially aspirations for better and flourishing futures. The first point is about ensuring that the outcome measured is actually what is measured and reported; the second is about ensuring that the outcome measured is validated as eudemonistically important by those concerned. As the sociologist Cameron famously stated, "not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted" (1967, 13).

Participatory research and methods, because they typically engage stakeholders in setting out the real-world goals that are meaningful to them, lend themselves to an assessment of these outcomes based on participatory methods. In other words, participatory research and methods allow us to evaluate what something means and implies for agents. This incorporation of the agency, meaning-making, and learning opportunities of participants offers important safeguards against the pitfalls associated with outcomes that are detrimental to their well-being. An illustration of this is the development of patient-reported outcome measures, which stress how important it is to capture outcomes in ways that reflect the first-person experience of, in this case, patients (see, e.g., the work of the Critical Path Institute [2024]).[15] But the same could be true for the evaluation of policies or of business practices. What ultimately counts as the results is actually captured in the way that the situations are experienced (Fiester 2015). Finally, another advantage of participatory research and methods is the connection of agents and contexts, which is maintained throughout the process. Accordingly, many possible meaningful ethical guideposts for evaluating the outcome of a participatory project on human flourishing (e.g., situational awareness and situational continuity within the project; engagement of stakeholders and agency distribution) are actually part of the methodological orientation itself.

9. LIMITATIONS OF PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH AND THE USEFULNESS OF NON-PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES

There have been grand dualisms in debates about theories and methodologies of human action, which have divided sharply between appropriate and inappropriate methods (e.g., quantitative versus qualitative; explanatory versus interpretative). As I hinted above, no method is meaningful in and of itself. Participatory research and methods can be used in ways

that undermine human growth and flourishing, while non-participatory research methods can actually be very supportive of human agency and flourishing.

9.1 Usefulness of Non-Participatory Approaches

Non-participatory research and methods have an important role to play, despite my argument for favoring participatory methods wherever we can. Non-participatory approaches are not necessarily opposed to participatory approaches in terms of their ability to support agency and desires. In this section, I stress that methods that seem to rely on an epistemology of objectification can nevertheless be constitutive of processes that engage individuals as agents. In other words, any kind of knowledge, generated through more object-oriented approaches (e.g., understanding a situation without considering subjective perspective and experience) or more subject-oriented approaches (e.g., understanding a situation by taking into account subjective perspective and experience) can be amenable to a framework within which the agent is empowered to make decisions. The issue has often been that, when moving to object-oriented epistemologies, we have a hard time coming to a view where agency is recognized and participation is valued.

Non-participatory methods can be crucial to gathering more information about situations and processes. Sometimes, getting simple numbers about certain aspects of a problem situation, such as the number of people involved, the amount of times a given situation has been experienced, who has experienced it, who has not, and so forth, can be crucial to gain a better sense of the situation. Moreover, more quantitative methods (e.g., often encountered in psychological science) offer insights into the mechanisms involved in becoming aware of a given moral problem or of being unaware about it (Miller, Rodgers, and Bingham 2014; Weaver 2007). Understanding the psychology of human situations and the situational aspects of human behavior in greater depth can also be important (Rauthmann, Sherman, and Funder 2015). These phenomena can also be better understood through non-participatory methods, provided that they are not overcast by a form of scientism and positivism that precludes the engagement of individuals as situated agents. Non-participatory methods can also have a role to play in evaluating action, although here, again, there needs to be a mindful use of these methods in order to avoid reducing outcomes to only those that can be measured, including using a certain kind of tool (e.g., scales). In this regard, cross-

checking different approaches and philosophies (e.g., participatory with non-participatory, and vice versa; qualitative with quantitative, and vice versa) can only be enlightening, provided that there is an open discussion and an open epistemological approach.

Take, for example, the strong trend toward object-oriented knowledge in biomedical science. Although it is mostly reliant on a positivist epistemology and world view, it can nevertheless be humanized and used in ways that are aligned with, and in the service of, human values and individuals (Upshur and Goldenberg 2020). It is, in fact, what most often happens when clinicians deal with clinical realities and with patients on what course of action to take (Evidence Based Medicine Working Group 1992). The gap between the way the basic research is generated (e.g., through the objectivation of disease and its study in experimental and preclinical models) and the actual practice of healthcare professions does indeed create a challenge for seeing the patient as a person, but this is not impossible. The practical standpoint is where integration does (and sometimes does not) happen. So, even though this may sound like a contradiction (based on the previous section), there is no need to adopt a rigid dichotomy that would prevent certain forms of knowledge from being used within a framework where agents participate and use the knowledge for their own goals. In other words, object-oriented research is not inherently alienating and subject-diminishing if it is placed in the context of a broader understanding of human agency that includes subjectivity and experience, and that makes room for engagement and meaning-making. The real problem or issue is that, given the tremendous power and support attributed to modern biomedical science as an economic and social enterprise, and its relationship with capitalism as a form of activity that sustains economic growth, there is great economic interest in supporting the authority of biomedical science and developing new products (Foucault 1994). In other words, when examining the benefits of interventions, there is a real challenge of doing justice to considerations that are driven by human development, flourishing, and well-being alongside those that are driven by the ability to generate economic growth and profit (Habermas 1968). Bell and Pahl (2018) explain, for example, how participatory research and participatory action research are at odds with some basic tenets of liberalism (and neoliberalism) by challenging power asymmetries and the concentration of power and knowledge. Thus, biomedical science and human flourishing are clearly not intrinsically opposed, but conjugating these two forces, when they are opposed, puts

[132.204.9.239] Project MUSE (2024-12-03 13:43 GMT) University of Montreal

one party at a clear disadvantage. Also, as I signaled above, participatory methods that may appear to be subject-oriented may be diverted from participatory epistemology and used in ways that instrumentalize persons and objects. These methods are not a magic bullet in and of themselves.

9.2 On the Limitations of Participatory Research and Methods

Participatory research can be severed from its deeper epistemological commitments—as expressed by pragmatist theory in ethics, notably—when it is boiled down to specific methods (Montreuil et al. 2021). Think here of focus groups, which can be used for marketing research, as opposed to focus groups used to support the potential of participants to become agents (i.e., empowerment). It is true that even less meaningful participation (e.g., in marketing research) is likely to be evaluated positively by participants, but in the broader scheme of human flourishing, a critical analysis of these benefits may not stand, since the results will likely empower companies and marketing strategies that are then used to shape the preferences, motivations, and agency of other human beings. Take, for example, children who might very well enjoy participating in marketing discussion groups about new toys.[16] This experience may be formative and later help them voice their concerns in other domains of their lives (e.g., health, education). Also, the toys produced could be improved because of this process, thereby bringing more pleasure to children. At the same time, some of the overarching goals of large corporations involved in such research may be contrary to the pursuit of flourishing, such that one must exercise caution about the positive impact of participatory methods when they are isolated from the idea of participatory research (Montreuil et al. 2021).

This point holds true for participatory research in ethics, too. Even in research that taps into more substantive barriers to flourishing, there are often moments where participants express their gratitude for simply having been able to reflect on the meaning of their experiences or to have spoken with others about their situation.[17] They may feel empowered in so far as they have this positive and liberating experience. But at the same time, it can remain a limited experience where insights are generated but not applied, such that they do not appear to bring about any meaningful change. Qualitative research generally helps participants discuss subjects in ways that create opportunities to see the connection between their thoughts and actions. There is, no doubt, a liberating effect at stake, and the reconnection of thought and action counters the alienation (Seligman 1975) so adamantly criticized by thinkers like Marx, Engels, and others.

However, even if this may be the necessary start of research that liberates human agency, it is certainly not the endpoint. This simply means that participation must be envisioned broadly. Although I realize that this is an ideal, participation is also undertaken as an attempt to facilitate the ongoing development of human beings as agents of change in their own lives. For example, the autonomy or the mastery of one's environment gained through participation are positive experiences, as well as conditions for further positive experiences of continuous learning.

10. CONCLUSION

This article reviewed why participatory research and methods are particularly well suited to promote human flourishing and thus align with insights of pragmatist ethics as a form of open-ended eudemonism, as exemplified in deliberative wisdom theory (Racine 2025). Participatory research and methods invite a broadening of the view of ethics and all the people involved in ethics. For example, they call for the co-understanding and co-reconstruction of problem situations and recognize the importance attributed to meaning and subjectivity because each person experiences the world from a unique point of view. Accordingly, because no one claims to hold the ethical truth about the good life, we are all students of human flourishing and can learn from each other—as genuine co-learners—granted that we embark in research and action schemes that provide for this and remain open to it. As bearers of knowledge about what is valuable, and as seekers of what is best for each of us and for all of us, we are empowered agents who can think about and contribute to enacting change. Participatory research and methods foster the use of open and participatory evaluations of outcomes to human flourishing (i.e., outcome measures that help people learn about or identify the gaps between our projected scenarios and the actual unfolding of what is undertaken). Finally, participatory research and methods are especially well aligned with forms of ethics that envision the ethical life as a lifelong quest for knowledge and growth in the ability to find meaning, reflect on the world, and help others to do so too (Abma 2005; Abma et al. 2017).

Participatory research and methods align with democracy as a political regime that tries to connect concerns for human flourishing with active participation (Jacobs 2018). Progression toward democracy as a participatory social order—in healthcare and beyond—is not linear, historically speaking, with setbacks and important struggles marking the march. However, it is becoming increasingly hard to ignore the evidence

about the connection between flourishing and education, health, and democratic and economic policies (Ainge Roy 2019; Clark et al. 2019). There are also examples of promising practices that are much better aligned with such goals, where inequalities are recognized as threats to health and well-being, and where authoritative governance is recognized as contrary to human flourishing (Paquin 2014; Raynault, Côté, and Chartrand 2013). These examples show us that, to paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, we must keep our "eyes on the stars but our feet on the ground."

NOTES

1. Further details on this study titled "Evaluating the implementation of the secret agent society program for autistic children across community-based mental health agencies", please consult Lee et al. (2024).
2. The terminology of "participant" is used to designate people involved in participatory research and participatory action research. Depending on the context, the terminology of patients is used to described people as recipients of healthcare services and "patient partners" when patients take on an active role within their care.
3. The action plan developed in this participatory study is structured in four components: "Component A presents the key moral challenges encountered by patients, which are the lack of knowledge on rare diseases among healthcare workers, the problematic attitudes that it sometimes elicits, and the distress and powerlessness experienced by patients. Component B emphasizes a vision for patient partnership in rare disease care characterized by open-mindedness, empathy, respect, and support of patient autonomy from healthcare workers. Component C outlines two courses of action that are prompted by this vision, which are raising awareness among healthcare workers and empowering patients to better navigate their care. Component D compares several interventions that could help integrate these two courses of action in rare disease care" (Quintal et al. 2023).
4. Following Racine (2024), I distinguish between the domain of morality and the field of ethics. In short, *morality* designates the domain of quotidian and habitual ways of dealing with moral problems, and ethics refers to the discipline that attempts to solve moral problems when our commonsensical intuitions about morality fail to provide meaningful responses. Throughout this article, I try as much as I can to preserve the terminology of morality for the experiential and habitual ways of dealing with moral problems and use the terminology of ethics for the deliberate and reflective attempt to deal with a moral problem. Accordingly, there is a distinction between being simply a moral agent and being an active ethical agent.

5 The exact formulation by Peirce is the following: "it appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object" (1878, 293).

6. Pragmatist ethics theory advocates for a scientific (but not a scientistic) understanding of ethics, in the sense that our ethical knowledge and approaches (and the processes that support them) should be tested and reflected upon (Moreno 1999; Racine 2008b). This is a generous and inclusive concept of science.

7. For example, Alice Chipman Dewey (married to John Dewey) ran the Lab School at the University of Chicago, a pioneering experiment in pedagogy, democracy, and ethics that informed much of Dewey's writings about education and democracy. Jane Addams, notable pragmatist philosopher and social reformer (Nobel Peace Prize laureate of 1931, first American woman to receive the prize), was heavily involved in women's rights and pacifism, and ran Hull House in Chicago, the most famous settlement house. (Settlement houses were places where incoming immigrants lived and were offered social and health services as well as higher education in the hope of diminishing disparities (Wade 1967)). Thousands of immigrants benefited from these services, and Addams was adamant about the need to undertake grounded participatory research on issues such as the causes of poverty.

8. The contribution of women to the development of pragmatism is underestimated. Many women exercised profound influence on the more recognized male theoreticians like Dewey and Mead. Moreover, because of their restricted access to university positions (and the abstract and disconnected academic culture that prevailed there), they (e.g., Ella Flagg Young, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Elsie Ripley Clapp, Lucy Sprague Mitchell, Jessie Taft) often chose to develop and lead concrete initiatives such as schools where they could live their philosophy. I recommend to the very approachable introduction written by Clara Fischer (2023).

9. I here consider participatory research as a bridge between the theory of pragmatism and specific methods such that participatory research gives specific goals meaning in the use of methods (which can be used in non-participatory ways) and gives specific application to theories that would otherwise remain disconnected from concrete situations without a connection to methods.

10. Photovoice is a qualitative research method that is often used within the context of participatory action research where participants employ photography, narratives to share experiences, and support related action.

11. There are also rarely acknowledged connections between insights found in pragmatism (e.g., William James's concept of horizon) and the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions, although Husserl reported being significantly influenced by James's psychology. (For further explanation, I invite readers to consult Fesmire's 2003 analysis. Some more recent scholarship is actively excavating these important links (e.g., Gallagher 2022, and the entire symposium in "Pragmatism and Phenomenology. A Metaphilosophical Reconsideration," in which this paper was presented (Bell and Manca 2022)).
12. For some philosophical theories of human behavior, meaning-making is in fact a hallmark of the human world (Gadamer 1989; Taylor 1971). Therefore, most forms of reductionism that challenge the existence of human meaning and subjectivity are opposed to the spirit of participatory approaches since they deny this important dimension of human life, and of moral life in particular, in the context of ethics. This does not mean that the knowledge about human morality generated in fields more embedded in positivist epistemologies (e.g., psychology, contemporary neuroscience) is incompatible with human-making activities (Racine 2005; 2008a). However, it may imply that the role of more object-oriented knowledge is reconciled with more subject-oriented forms of self-knowledge (Racine and Sample 2018) where the transactional nature of human knowledge is acknowledged (Foucart 2013) and where knowledge of all sorts is taken as a tool to support human agency and, notably from an ethical standpoint, human development and flourishing.
13. Evidence of the impact of more egalitarian cultures, including management practices and work cultures (on management practices, see Chen 2018), on everyone's health (Daniels 2008) and broader well-being is worth keeping in mind here (Sen 2002).
14. This mutually informative relationship between context and agents is consistent with the recognition of social construction of the self in relationship to the body and the environment developed by Dewey (1922) and Mead (1934). Indeed, they advanced that one's own self is tied to interpretations of situations, of one's own agency and identity, that all these interpretations and identities reflect transactions or patterns of transaction between organism and environment. This transactional perspective is also highly consistent with the feminist theories of the social constitution of the self and the doctrine of relational autonomy that cohere with such an understanding of the self as being shaped by the environment and vice versa (Campbell 2002; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Pappas 2008).
15. There are countless examples of how a therapy, based on more objective measures or biomarkers, can be judged to be useful, but with limited benefits

to patients (e.g., see deep brain stimulation where early outcomes had been seen as successful for clinicians but disappointing for patients; Agid et al. 2006; Mathieu, Bell, and Racine 2011).

16. For an example of a marketing statement to that effect, see Boughton (2024).
17. There can be exceptions here, too. William Affleck's work on bereavement and trauma shows that gendered ways of understanding bereavement and the bereavement process may imply that orientations toward talking and sharing openly about grief may not only be ineffective and ill-adapted to some, but may actually lead to greater anxiety and distress (Affleck, Glass, and Macdonald 2013; Macdonald et al. 2010).

REFERENCES

Abma, Teneke A. 2005. "Responsive Evaluation in Health Promotion: Its Value for Ambiguous Contexts." *Health Promotion International* 20 (4): 391–97. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/dai013.

Abma, Teneke A., Yolande Voskes, and Guy Widdershoven. 2017. "Participatory Bioethics Research and its Social Impact: The Case of Coercion Reduction in Psychiatry." *Bioethics* 31 (2): 144–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12319.

Affleck, William, Kathleen C Glass, and Mary Ellen Macdonald. 2013. "The Limitations of Language: Male Participants, Stoicism, and the Qualitative Research Interview." *American Journal of Men's Health* 7 (2): 155–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/1557988312464038.

Agid, Yves, Michael Schüpbach, Marcella Gargiulo, L. Mallet, J. L. Houeto, C. Behar, D. Mesnage, and M. L. Welter. 2006. "Neurosurgery in Parkinson's Disease: The Doctor is Happy, the Patient Less So?" *Journal of Neural Transmission Supplementum* (70): 409–14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-211-45295-0_61.

Aiguier, Grégory, and Alain Loute. 2016. «L'intervention éthique en santé: un apprentissage collectif.» *Nouvelles Pratiques Sociales* 28 (2): 158–72. https://doi.org/10.7202/1041185ar.

Ainge Roy, Eleanor. 2019. "New Zealand's World-First 'Wellbeing' Budget to Focus on Poverty and Mental Health." *The Guardian*. May 14. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/14/new-zealands-world-first-wellbeing-budget-to-focus-on-poverty-and-mental-health.

Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, and World Health Organization (WHO). 2016. *Open Mindsets: Participatory Leadership for Health*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/251458/9789241511360-eng.pdf;jsessionid=CF9D86A1E691D45ECF4803EB913E37F6?sequence=1.

[132.204.9.239] Project MUSE (2024-12-03 13:43 GMT) University of Montreal

Andre, Judith. 2004. *Bioethics as a Practice*. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press.

Baumeister, Roy F., Kathleen D. Vohs, Jennifer L. Aaker, and Emily N. Garbinsky. 2013. "Some Key Differences Between a Happy Life and a Meaningful Life." *Journal of Positive Psychology* 8 (6): 505–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2013.830764.

Bélanger, Guy. 2012. *Alphonse Desjardins, 1854–1920*. Québec: Septentrion.

Bell, David M., and Kate Pahl. 2018. "Co-production: Towards a Utopian Approach." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 21 (1): 105–17. https://doi:10.1080/13645579.2017.1348581.

Bell, Emma, Nik Winchester, and Edward Wray-Bliss. 2021. "Enchantment in Business Ethics Research." *Journal of Business Ethics* 174 (2): 251–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04592-4.

Bell, Jason, and Danilo Manca. 1022. "A Meta-Philosophical Introduction to the Encounter between Pragmatism and Phenomenology", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* [Online], XIV-2 | 2022. Available at http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2968; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.2968

Bergold, Jarg, and Stefan Thomas. 2012. "Participatory Research Methods: A Methodological Approach in Motion." *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 13 (1): 191–222. https://doi.org/10.17169/fqs-13.1.1801.

Bidet, Alexandra, Louis Quéré, and Gérôme Truc, eds. 2011. «Ce à quoi nous tenons. Dewey et la formation des valeurs.» In *John Dewey, La formation des valeurs*, edited by Alexandra Bidet, Louis Quéré, and Gérôme Truc, 5–64. Paris: La Découverte.

Biesta, Gert. 2015. "Pragmatism and the Philosophical Foundations of Mixed Methods Research." In *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*, edited by Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie, 95–118. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Borry, Pascal, Paul Schotsmans, and Kris Dierickx. 2005. "The Birth of the Empirical Turn in Bioethics." *Bioethics* 19 (1): 49–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00424.x.

Boughton, Lisa. 2024. "How to Engage Young People and Kids in Market Research." Angelfish Fieldwork Ltd. https://info.angelfishfieldwork.com/market-research-fieldwork-blog/how-to-engage-kids-and-young-people-in-mr.

Brown, James M., Alison L. Kitson, and Terence J. McKnight. 1992. "Moral Deliberation." In *Challenges in Caring: Explorations in Nursing and Ethics*, edited by James M. Brown, Alison L. Kitson, and Terence J. McKnight, 13–29. New York: Springer.

Brinkmann, Svend. 2011. "Dewey's Neglected Psychology: Rediscovering His Transactional Approach." *Theory & Psychology* 21 (3): 298–317. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354310376123.

Buchanan David Ross, Franklin G. Miller, and Nina Wallerstein. 2007. "Ethical Issues in Community-Based Participatory Research: Balancing Rigorous Research with Community Participation in Community Intervention Studies." *Progress in Community Health Partnerships* 1 (2): 153–60. https://doi.org/10.1353/cpr.2007.0006.

Budig, Kirsten, Julia Diez, Paloma Conde, Marta Sastre, Mariano Hernán, and Franco Manuel. 2018. "Photovoice and Empowerment: Evaluating the Transformative Potential of a Participatory Action Research Project." *BMC Public Health* 18 (1): 432. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-018-5335-7.

Callahan, Daniel. 1973. "Bioethics as a Discipline." *Hasting Center Studies* 1 (1): 66–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/3527474.

Cameron, William Bruce. 1967. Informal Sociology, A Casual Introduction to Sociological Thinking, Fifth printing, Random House, New York.

Campbell, Sue. 2002. "Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self." *Hypatia* 17 (2): 165–68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810758.

Cascio, M. Ariel, and Eric Racine. 2018. "Person-Oriented Research Ethics: Integrating Relational and Everyday Ethics in Research." *Accountability in Research* 25 (3): 170–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2018.1442218.

Cascio, M. Ariel, and Eric Racine. 2019. *Research Involving Participants with Cognitive Disability and Differences: Ethics, Autonomy, Inclusion, and Innovation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cascio, M. Ariel, Jonathan A. Weiss, Eric Racine, and the Task Force Autism Research Ethics. 2020. "Person-Oriented Ethics for Autism Research: Creating Best Practices Through Engagement with Autism and Autistic Communities." *Autism* 24 (7): 1676–690. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361320918763.

Chen, Pauline W. 2018."A More Egalitarian Hospital Culture Is Better for Everyone." *New York Times*. May 31. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/well/live/doctors-patients-hospital-culture-better-health.html.

Chevalier, Jacques M., and Daniel J. Buckles. 2013. *Participatory Action Research: Theory and Methods for Engaged Inquiry*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

Chirkov, Valery, Richard M. Ryan, Youngmee Kim, and Ulas Kaplan. 2003."Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-Being." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84 (1): 97–110. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.97.

Clark, David Alexander, Mario Biggeri, and Alexandre Apsan Frediani. 2019. *The Capability Approach, Empowerment and Participation: Concepts, Methods and Applications*. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Cotkin, Georde. 1985. "William James and the Cash-Value Metaphor." *ETC: A Review of General Semantics* 42 (1): 37–46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42576722.

Crane, Melanie, Adrian Bauman, Beverley Lloyd, Bronwyn McGill, Chris Rissel, and Anne Grunseit. 2019. "Applying Pragmatic Approaches to Complex Program Evaluation: A Case Study of Implementation of the New South Wales Get Healthy at Work Program." *Health Promotion Journal of Australia* 30 (3): 422–32. https://doi.org/10.1002/hpja.239.

Critical Path Institute. 2024. "Patient-Reported Outcome Consortium." Critical Path Institute. https://c-path.org/program/patient-reported-outcome-consortium/.

Daniels, Norman. 2008. *Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly*. Cambridge University Press.

Deci, Edward L., and Richard M. Ryan. 2000. "The 'What' and 'Why' of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and Self-Determination Theory in Human Behavior." *Psychological Inquiry* 11 (4): 227–68. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01.

Dewey, John. 1922. *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology*. New York: Holt.

Dewey, John. 1941. "Propositions, Warranted Assertability, and Truth." *Journal of Philosophy* 38 (7): 169–86. https://doi-org/10.2307/2017978.

Draper, Heather, and Jonathan Ives. 2007. "An Empirical Approach to Bioethics: Social Science 'of', 'for' and 'in' Bioethics Research: An Interdisciplinary Journal." *Cognition, Brain, Behavior* 11 (2): 319–27, 329–30.

Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group. Evidence-based medicine. A new approach to teaching the practice of medicine. JAMA. 1992 Nov 4;268(17):2420-5. doi: 10.1001/jama.1992.03490170092032. PMID: 1404801.

Fesmire, Steven. 2003. *John Dewey & Moral Imagination*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Fiester, Autumn M. 2015. "Weaponizing Principles: Clinical Ethics Consultations & the Plight of the Morally Vulnerable." *Bioethics* 29 (5): 309–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12115.

Fins, Joseph J., Matthew D. Bacchetta, and Franklin G Miller. 1998. "Clinical Pragmatism: Bridging Theory and Practice." *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 8 (1): 37–42. https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.1998.0001.

Fischer, Clara. 2023. "Feminist-Pragmatism." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by James Fieser and Bradley Dowden. Retrieved June 20, 2023. https://iep.utm.edu/fem-prag/.

Fischer, Frank. 2012. "Participatory Governance: From Theory to Practice." In *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*, edited by David Levi-Faur, 457–71. Oxford: Oxford Academic.

Foucart, Jean. 2013. «Pragmatisme et transaction. La perspective de John Dewey.» *Pensée plurielle* 33–4 (2): 73–84. https://doi.org/10.3917/pp.033.0073.

Foucault, Michel. 1994. «La naissance de la médecine sociale.» In *Dits et écrits*, edited by Gallimard, 207–28. Paris: Gallimard.

Frega, Roberto, and Felipe Carreira da Silva. 2011. "Pragmatism and the Social Sciences: A Century of Influences and Interactions." *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* 3 (2). https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.812.

Freire, Paulo. 2000. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. 30th anniversary ed. New York: Bloomsbury.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1989. *Truth and Method*. 2nd ed. London: Sheed and Ward.

Gallagher, Shaun. 2022. "Phenomenology and Pragmatism: From the End to the Beginning." *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* XIV 2 (2022). https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.2985.

Glasgow, Russell E. 2013. "What Does it Mean to be Pragmatic? Pragmatic Methods, Measures, and Models to Facilitate Research Translation." *Health Education & Behavior: The Official Publication of the Society for Public Health Education* 40 (3): 257–65. https://doi.org/10.1177/1090198113486805.

Gross, Neil. 2009. "A Pragmatist Theory of Social Mechanisms." *American Sociological Review* 74 (June): 358–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400302.

Guillemin, Marilys, and Lynn Gillam. 2004. "Ethics, Reflexivity, and 'Ethically Important Moments' in Research." *Qualitative Inquiry* 10 (2): 261–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800403262360.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1968. *Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie."* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Hennen, Leonhard. 2012. "Why do we Still Need Participatory Technology Assessment?" *Poiesis Praxis: International Journal of Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment* 9 (1–2): 27–41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10202-012-0122-5.

Hitlin, Steven. 2003. "Values as the Core of Personal Identity: Drawing Links between Two Theories of Self." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 66 (2): 118–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1519843.

Hossain, Mokter, Seppo Leminen, and Mika Westerlund. 2019. "A Systematic Review of Living Lab Literature." *Journal of Cleaner Production* 213: 976–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.257.

Inguaggiato, Giulia, Suzanne Metselaar, Rouven Porz, and Guy Widdershoven. 2019. "A Pragmatist Approach to Clinical Ethics Support: Overcoming the Perils of Ethical Pluralism." *Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy* 22 (3): 427–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-018-09882-3.

Inguaggiato, Giulia, Suzanne Metselaar, Guy Widdershoven, and Bert Molewijk. 2019. "Clinical Ethics Expertise as the Ability to Co-Create Normative Recommendations by Guiding a Dialogical Process of Moral Learning." *American Journal of Bioethics* 19 (11): 71–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2019.1665735.

Jacobs, Steven Darryl. 2018. "A History and Analysis of the Evolution of Action and Participatory Action Research." *Canadian Journal of Action Research* 19 (3): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.33524/cjar.v19i3.412.

Jagosh, Justin, Ann C. Macaulay, Pierre Pluye, Jon Salsberg, Paula L. Bush, Jim Henderson, Erin Sirett, et al. 2012. "Uncovering the Benefits of Participatory Research: Implications of a Realist Review for Health Research and Practice." *Milbank Quarterly* 90 (2): 311–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0009.2012.00665.x.

Khanlou, Nazilla, and Elizabeth Peter. 2005. "Participatory Action Research: Considerations for Ethical Review." *Social Science & Medicine* 60 (10): 2333–340. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.10.004.

Kolb, David A. 1984. *Experiential Learning*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Kwan, Crystal, and Christine A. Walsh. 2018. "Ethical Issues in Conducting Community-Based Participatory Research: A Narrative Review of the Literature." *The Qualitative Report* 23 (2): 369–86. https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2018.3331.

Langley, Joe, Daniel Wolstenholme, and Jo Cooke. 2018. "'Collective Making' as Knowledge Mobilisation: The Contribution of Participatory Design in the Co-Creation of Knowledge in Healthcare." *BMC Health Services Research* 18 (1): 585. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-018-3397-y.

Lanteigne, Amélie, Mathilde Genest, and Eric Racine. 2021. "The Evaluation of Pediatric-Adult Transition Programs: What place for Human Flourishing?" *Social Science & Medicine–Mental Health* 1: 100007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmmh.2021.100007.

Lassiter, Luke Eric. 2005. *The Chicago Guide to Collaborative Ethnography*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Lee, Vivian, Jonathan Weiss, Ariel Cascio, Eric Racine, Joanna Lake, Meng Chun Lai, Kendra Thomson, Kylie Gray, Stephanie Ameis, Melissa Legree, Cathy Lonergan. 2024. "Evaluating the implementation of the secret agent society program for autistic children across community-based mental health agencies." Kids Brain Health Network, Cycle III Implementation Program Application 2022-2024. ttps://kidsbrainhealth.ca/index.php/portfolio-items/supporting-the-mental-health-of-kids-with-autism/

Legg, Catherine, and Christopher Hookway. 2021. "Pragmatism." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 ed.). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/.

Lehoux, Pascale, Fiona A. Miller, and Bryn Williams-Jones. 2020. "Anticipatory Governance and Moral Imagination: Methodological Insights from a Scenario-Based Public Deliberation Study." *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 151: 119800. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2019.119800.

Macdonald, Mary Ellen, Gillian Chilibeck, William Affleck, and Susan Cadell. 2010. "Gender Imbalance in Pediatric Palliative Care Research Samples." *Palliative Medicine* 24 (4): 435–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269216309354396.

Mackenzie, Catriona, and Natalie Stoljar, eds. 2000. *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Automony, Agency, and the Social Self*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mathieu, Ghislaine, Emily Bell, and Eric Racine. 2011. "Subjective Outcomes Measurement and Regulatory Oversight for Deep Brain Stimulation Outcomes in Parkinson's Disease." *American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience* 2 (1): 16–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2010.537535.

McGee, Glenn. 2003. *Pragmatic Bioethics*. In *Basic Bioethics*, edited by Glenn McGee, and Arthur Caplan. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mead, George Herbert. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Menand, Louis. 2001. *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America*. New York: MacMillan Publishers.

Metselaar, Suzanne, Guy Widdershoven, Rouven Porz, and Bert Molewijk. 2017. "Evaluating Clinical Ethics Support: A Participatory Approach." *Bioethics* 31 (4): 258–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12348.

Miller, Franklin G., Joseph J. Fins., and Matthew D. Bacchetta. 1996. "Clinical Pragmatism: John Dewey and Clinical Ethics." *Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy* 13 (1): 27–51. https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.1997.0013.

Miller, Jared A., Zachariah J. Rodgers, and John B. Bingham. 2014. "Moral Awareness." In *Research Companion to Ethical Behavior in Organizations: Constructs and Measures*, edited by Bradley R. Agle, George W. Romney,

[132.204.9.239] Project MUSE (2024-12-03 13:43 GMT) University of Montreal

David W. Hart, Jeffery A. Thompson, and Hilary M. Hendricks, 1–43. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Misak, Cheryl. 2013. *The American Pragmatists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Montreuil, Marjorie, Aline Bogossian, Emilie Laberge-Perrault, and Eric Racine. 2021. "A Review of Approaches, Strategies and Ethical Considerations in Participatory Research with Children." *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 20. https://doi.org/10.1177/160940692098796 2.

Montreuil, Marjorie, and Franco A. Carnevale. 2018. "Participatory Hermeneutic Ethnography: A Methodological Framework for Health Ethics Research with Children." *Qualitative Health Research* 28 (7): 1135–144. https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732318757489.

Montreuil, Marjorie, Catherine Thibeault, Linda McHarg, and Franco A. Carnevale. 2020. "Moral Experiences of Crisis Management in a Child Mental Health Setting: A Participatory Hermeneutic Ethnographic Study." *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 44 (1): 80–109. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11013-019-09639-4.

Moreno, Jonathan. 1999. "Bioethics is a Naturalism." In *Pragmatic Bioethics*, edited by Glenn McGee, 5–17. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

Murray, Lee. 2003. "Qualitative Research Interviews: Therapeutic Benefits for the Participants." *Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing* 10: 233–36. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2850.2003.00553.x.

New York Times. 1952. "Obituary. Dr. John Dewey Dead at 92; Philosopher a Noted Liberal." *The New York Times*. June 2. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1020.html.

Ntelioglou, Burcu Yaman. 2015. "English language Learners, Participatory Ethnography and Embodied Knowing Within Literacy Studies. In *Routledge Handbook of Literacy Studie*s, edited by Jennifer Rowsell and Kate Pahl, 532–47. New York: Routledge.

Pappas, Gregory Fernando. 2008. *John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Paquin, Stéphane, Pier-Luc Lévesque. 2014. *Social-démocraite* 2.0: le Québec *comparé aux pays Scandinaves*. Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

Parry, Richard, and Harry Thorsrud. 2021. "Ancient Ethical Theory." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2021 ed.). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-ancient/.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1877. "The Fixation of Belief." *Popular Science Monthly* 12 (November): 1–15.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1878. "How to Make our Ideas Clear." *Popular Science Monthly* 12 (January): 286–302.

Pekarsky, Daniel. 1990. "Dewey's Conception of Growth Reconsidered." *Educational Theory* 40 (9): 283–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1990.00283.x.

Perkins, Douglas D., Marc A. Zimmerman. 1995. "Empowerment Theory, Research, and Application." *American Journal of Community Psychology* 23 (5): 569–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02506982.

Pluhar, Evelyn. 1988. "Moral Agents and Moral Patients." *Between the Species* 4 (1): 32–45. https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.1988v4n1.8.

Quintal, Ariane, Isabelle Carreau, Annie-Danielle Grenier, Caroline Hébert, Christing Yergeau, Yves Berthiaume, and Eric Racine. 2023. "An Ethics Action Plan for Rare Disease Care: Participatory Action." *Journal of Participatory Medicine*. 15: e46607. https://doi.org/10.2196/46607.

Racine, Eric. 2002. «Éthique de la discussion et génomique des populations.» Éthique *publique* 4 (1): 77–90. https://doi.org/10.4000/ethiquepublique.2483.

Racine, Eric. 2005. «Pourquoi et comment doit-on tenir compte des neurosciences en éthique? Esquisse d'une approche neurophilosophique émergentiste et interdisciplinaire.» *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 61 (1): 77–105. https://doi.org/10.7202/011510ar.

Racine, Eric. 2008a. "Interdisciplinary Approaches for a Pragmatic Neuroethics." *American Journal of Bioethics* 8 (1): 52–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701828444.

Racine, Eric. 2008b. "Which Naturalism for Bioethics? A Defense of Moderate (Pragmatic) Naturalism." *Bioethics* 22 (2): 92–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00604.x.

Racine, Eric. 2022. "How Ethics Liberates Experience: Insights from Pragmatist Theory and Contemporary Research." *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 36 (4): 517–36. https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.36.4.0517.

Racine, Eric. 2025. *The Theory of Deliberative Wisdom*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Racine, Eric, Ariel Cascio, Marjorie Montreuil, and Aline Bogossian. 2019. "Instrumentalist Analyses of the Functions of Ethics Concept-Principles: A Proposal for Synthetic Empirical and Conceptual Enrichment." *Theoretical Medicine Bioethics* 40: 253–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-019-09502-y.

Racine, Eric, Sophie Ji, Valérie Badro, Aline Bogossian, Claude Julie Bourque, Marie-Ève Bouthillier, Vanessa Chenel, Clara Dallaire, Hubert Doucet, Caroline Favron-Godbout, Marie-Chantal Fortin, Isabelle Ganache, Anne-Sophie Guernon, Marjorie Montreuil, Catherine Olivier, Ariane Quintal, Abdou

Simon Senghor, Michèle Stanton-Jean, Joé T. Martineau, Andréanne Talbot, Nathalie Tremblay. 2024. "Living Ethics: A Stance and its Implications in Health Ethics". *Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy* (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10197-9. Med Health Care and Philos 27, 137–154 (2024).

Racine, E., Danaë Lariviere-Bastien, Emily Bell, Annette Majnemer, and Michael Shevell. 2012. "Respect for Autonomy in the Healthcare Context: Observations from a Qualitative Study of Young Adults with Cerebral Palsy." *Child: Care, Health and Development* 39 (6): 873–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/cch.12018.

Racine, Eric, and Matthew Sample. 2018. "Two Problematic Foundations of Neuroethics and Pragmatist Reconstructions." *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics* 27 (4): 566–77. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180118000099.

Ralston, Shane J. 2010. "Dewey's Theory of Moral (and Political) Deliberation Unfiltered." *Education and Culture* 26 (1): 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1353/eac.0.0049.

Rauthmann, John F., Ryne A. Sherman, and David C. Funder. 2015. "Principles of Situation Research: Towards a Better Understanding of Psychological Situations." *European Journal of Personality* 29 (3): 363–81. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.1994.

Raynault, Marie-France, Dominique Côté, and Sébastien Chartrand. 2013. *Le bon sens à la scandinave: politiques et inégalités sociales de santé*. Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

Reason, Peter, and Hilary Bradbury. 2008. *Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Ricoeur, Paul. 1990. *Soi-m*ême *comme un autre*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Roosevelt, Theodore. Address at Groton School. Theodore Roosevelt Collection. MS Am 1454.50 (138). Cambridge MA: Harvard College Library. Available at https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o285148

Ryff, Carol D., and Burton H. Singer. 2008. "Know Thyself and Become What You Are: A Eudaimonic Approach to Psychological Well-Being." *Journal of Happiness Studies* 9 (1): 13–39. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-006-9019-0.

Sample, Matthew, Marjorie Aunos, Stefanie Blain-Moraes, Christoph Bublitz, Jennifer A Chandler, Tiago H Falk, Orsolya Friedrich, et al. 2019. "Brain–Computer Interfaces and Personhood: Interdisciplinary Deliberations on Neural Technology." *Journal of Neural Engineering* 16 (6): 063001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1741-2552/ab39cd.

Seligman, Martin Elias Peter, and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. 2000. "Positive Psychology: An Introduction." *The American Psychologist* 55 (1): 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.5.

Seligman, Martin Elias Peter. 1975. *Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, Amartya. 2002. "Why Health Equity?" *Health Economics* 11 (8): 659–66. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.762

Senghor, Abdou Simon, and Eric Racine. 2022. "How to Evaluate the Quality of an Ethical Deliberation? A Pragmatist Proposal for Evaluation Criteria and Collaborative Research." *Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy* 25 (3):309-26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-022-10091-2.

Serra, Juan Pablo. 2010. "What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship." *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* 2 (2): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.905.

Sioui, Marjolaine, and Nancy Gros-Louis McHugh. 2021. «Notre vision du mieux-*ê*tre et de la santé.» Paper presented at the Montreal Health Ethics Seminar Series, Montréal.

Sugarman, Jeremy, Ruth Faden, and Judith Weinstein. 2001. "A Decade of Empirical Research in Medical Ethics." In *Methods in Medical Ethics*, edited by Jeremy Sugarman and Daniel P. Sulmasy, 19–28. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Taylor, Charles. 1971. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man." *Review of Metaphysics* 25: 3–51.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1982. "How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics." *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine* 25 (4): 736–50. https://doi.org/10.1353/pbm.1982.0064.

Upshur, Ross, and Maya Goldenberg. 2020. "Countering Medical Nihilism by Reconnecting Facts and Values." *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* (84): 75–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.08.005.

Wade, Louise C. 1967. "The Heritage from Chicago's Early Settlement Houses." *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society (1908-1984)* 60 (4): 411–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40190170.

Wallengren Lynch, Michael. 2016. "Re-Working Empowerment as a Theory for Practice." *Qualitative Social Work* 17 (3): 73–386. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473325016672917.

Wangmo, Tenzin, Sirin Hauri, Eloise Gennet, Evelyn Anane-Sarpong, Veerle Provoost, and Bernice S. Elger. 2018. "An Update on the 'Empirical Turn' in Bioethics: Analysis of Empirical Research in Nine Bioethics Journals." *BMC Medical Ethics* 19 (1): 6. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-018-0246-9.

Weaver, Kathryn. 2007. "Ethical Sensitivity: State of Knowledge and Needs for Further Research." *Nursing Ethics* 14 (2): 141–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/0969733007073694.

Whipps, Judy, and Danielle Lake. 2020. "Pragmatist Feminism." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2020 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femapproach-pragmatism/.

Whitehead, Jack, and Jean McNiff. 2006. *Action Research: Living Theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Whyte, William Foote. 1991. *Participatory Action Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Wolf, Susan M. 1994. "Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism." *American Journal of Law and Medicine* 20 (4): 395–415. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0098858800006821.